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1ABSTRACT
This paper not only recommends means whereby principal-agent problems could be addressed, but 
also  considers  various  ways  in  which  the  external  auditor  and  audit  committees  contribute  as 
corporate  governance  tools.  The  impact  of  bank regulations  on risk  taking  and the  need  for  a 
consideration  of  ownership  structures  are  amongst  other  issues  which  are  considered.  In 
acknowledging  the  issues  raised  by  ownership  structures,  it  considers  theories  such  as  the 
banking theory and corporate governance theory. It also considers other alternatives whereby risk 
taking could be controlled. In recommending the external auditor’s expertise to address principal 
agent problems, it draws attention to the audit committee’s roles, both as a vital and complementary 
corporate governance tool. It also highlights the importance of measures which need to be in place 
if the external auditor’s contribution to corporate governance is to be maximised. 
Finally the paper will propose criteria which should determine whether or not executives should be 
compensated,  as  well  as  consolidate  on  why  (compensation)  incentives  should  be  aimed  at 
generating  improved  long  term  performance  and  results  rather  than  a  focus  on  short  term 
performance and results.
Key  Words:  corporate  governance,  banking  theory,  risk,  ownership  structures,  auditor, 
disclosure, principal, agent, regulation, moral hazard, Efficient Markets Hypothesis, value 
relevance, compensation schemes, fair value accounting, Finance Theory
2The Role of External Auditors in Corporate Governance: Agency Problems and 
the Management of Risk
Marianne Ojo1
A. Introduction
Corporate  governance,  the  process  whereby  directors  of  a  company  are  monitored  and 
controlled,2 involves decision making, accountability and monitoring.3 Two aspects which are
considered  to  be  fundamental  to  corporate  governance  are:4
Supervision  and  monitoring  of management performance (the enterprise aspect) and ensuring 
accountability of management to shareholders and other stakeholders (the accountability aspect).
The level of monitoring undertaken by an agent, on behalf of its principal, is a primary determinant 
of the level of performance which can be attained by a firm. It is frequently contended that less 
dispersed ownership (ie concentrated ownership) generally results in greater monitoring on the part 
of the agents or management of the firm.
According  to  Maher  and  Andersson,  concentrated  ownership  not  only  brings  more  effective 
monitoring of management,  but also aids  in  overcoming the agency problems arising from the 
separation of ownership and control – even though they admit that certain costs, namely, that of low 
liquidity  and reduced possibilities for risk diversification, exist.5
Three  key  themes  which  are  considered  to  have  emerged  from  lessons  learned  from  various 
1 Email:marianneojo@hotmail.com
2  Cadbury Committee defines it as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled” 
3  See D Broadley, ‘Auditing and its Role in Corporate Governance’ 2006 Bank For International Settlements FSI
Seminar on Corporate Governance for Banks
4  See V Beattie, S Fearnley and R Brandt, Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About(ICAEW) at
page 26
5 M Maher and T Andersson, „Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and Economic Growth“ OECD 
1999 at page 3. They add that „one of the consequences of rent extraction in insider systems is the lack of liquidity 
in secondary markets as investors withhold funds – with the resulting consequence that capital markets in insider 
systems tend to be much less well developed than those found in outsider systems.“ see ibid at page 25
3corporate collapses are:6
emphasis  on  “substance  of  the  transaction”7 rather  than  legal  form,  transparency  and  the 
management  of risk.  Since (in  my opinion),  the management  of  risk is  considered to  have the 
greatest impact and significance in the fields of regulation and corporate governance, amongst these 
three themes, it will constitute the starting point and the focus of the study. The topic will, in part, 
be considered by way of reference to the impact of regulations on risk taking and the need for a 
consideration of ownership structures. Subsequent sections will consider not only the contribution 
of audit committees to corporate governance, but also illustrate why the presence of such bodies is 
vital to ensuring accountability and supervision within a company. In highlighting why the external 
auditor is such an indispensable tool in corporate governance, the final sections of this paper will 
attempt  to  demonstrate  how the  external  auditor  can  help to  resolve  agency problems -  whilst 
emphasising the audit committee’s significance in complementing the external auditor’s work.
Whilst the level of compensation is also necessary in motivating agents or executives, incentives 
should be aimed at generating improved long term performance and results rather than a focus on 
short term performance and results. Therefore rewards should be tied to those schemes which would 
encourage greater focus on long term results.  Such incentives would also discourage behaviour 
which results in high risk taking levels. Stock options, as well as dispersed ownership systems are 
considered to encourage „short termist behaviour“.8 
For  these  reasons,  the  involvement  of  other  actors  such  as  the  State  or  banks  in  corporate 
governance will be highlighted under section B - given the disadvantages of having an excessively 
powerful and dominating agent. However, the section will firstly also illustrate that bank regulations 
could also impact risk taking levels – both negatively and positively.
6  See House of Commons, Select Committee on Treasury, Minutes of Evidence (2002/03 Session) Appendix 6
Memorandum  by  the  Institute  of  Chartered  Accountants  in  England  and  Wales  http://www.parliament.the-
stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmtrdind/439/439ap07.htm (last visited 29 June 2009)
7  See particularly Financial Reporting Standard 5 “ Reporting the Substance of Transactions”
8 See M Maher and T Andersson, „Corporate Governance:  Effects on Firm Performance and Economic Growth“ 
OECD 1999 at page 23; Maher and Andersson also argue that „executive compensation geared to align the interest 
of  managers  with  those  of  shareholders  may serve  to  exacerbate  short-termist  behaviour.“  It  is  added  that  a 
preferrable  approach  would  be  to  limit  executive  remuneration  or  have  it  more  closely  linked  to  corporate 
performance.
4B. Management of Risk
I. Impact of Bank Regulations on Risk Taking
Whilst the application of bank regulations could lead to lower levels of risk taking, it could also
induce higher levels of risk taking.9
Lower levels of risk taking may occur where owners are compelled to invest more of their personal 
wealth in the bank and the converse may occur where capital requirements do not compel owners to 
invest more of their wealth in the bank – although they might encourage greater levels of capital to 
be generated.10
However Laeven and Levine add that since the relationship between risk and regulation is critically 
dependent on individual banks’ ownership structures, with the effect that the relationship between 
regulation and bank risk can vary according to ownership structure, a consideration of the impact of 
ownership structures is necessary in order to present a more accurate analysis of bank risk taking.11
Further, they illustrate their  assertion  through  a  demonstration  of  how  ownership  structure 
associates  with  bank regulations to impact the risk taking behaviour of individual banks.12
The following theories are considered:
• That the effect of regulation on risk is dependent on the relative influence of owners who  exist 
within governance structures of individual banks 
• That bank regulators influence risk taking incentives of owners in a different manner to those of 
managers (banking theory),
• That  ownership  structures  affect  the  ability  of  owners  to  influence  risk  (corporate 
governance theory)
9  L Laeven and R Levine, ‚Bank Governance, Regulations and Risk Taking’ 2008 at page 4
10  See ibid; Also see D Kim and A Santomero, ‚Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation’ 1994 Journal of Finance 43
at 1219-1233
11  L Laeven and R Levine, ‚Bank Governance, Regulations and Risk Taking’ 2008 Journal of Financial Economics at
page 6
12  ibid at page 5
5By merging the theories, they arrive at the conclusion that:13
Firstly,  owners who have “diversified” their  assets  have greater incentives to indulge in higher 
levels of risk taking than managers who are non shareholders and that as a result, banks which have 
powerful and diversified owners are more likely to be riskier than “widely held banks” – provided 
other factors are constantly maintained. Secondly, bank regulations such as capital requirements and 
deposit insurance, generate effects which differ when considered in relation to incentives of owners 
as  opposed to  that  of  managers  and that  as  a  result,  the  “comparative  power  of   shareholders 
relative  to  managers  within  each  bank’s  corporate  governance  structure” influences the real 
impact of regulations on risk taking.
In response to questions such as: i) why the corporate form of organization consisting of “widely
diffuse” ownership is so common - given the existence of “positive agency costs”14
ii) why the growth of equity in such organisations has been immense and iii) why many individuals 
are willing to entrust a huge proportion of their wealth to be managed by people with little interest 
in their welfare, Jensen and Meckling refer to the argument put forward by Manne,15  Alchian and
Demsetz,16 namely,  that the advantage of the corporate form (by way of sole proprietorships or 
partnerships)  is  attributable  to  the  limited  liability  of  equity  claims.17
However  Jensen  and Meckling are of the opinion that such argument does not provide sufficient 
explanation since limited liability is considered just to be a means of transferring basic risk – and 
not eliminating it.18
13  See ibid 
14  In Jensen and Meckling’s view, “The existence and size of the agency costs depends on the nature of the monitoring 
costs, the tastes of managers for non-pecuniary benefits and the supply of potential managers who are capable of 
financing the entire venture out of their personal wealth. If monitoring costs are zero, agency costs will be zero or if 
there are enough 100 percent owner-managers available to own and run all the firms in an industry (competitive or 
not) then agency costs in that industry will also be zero”. See M Jensen and W Meckling „Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” 1976 at pages 34 and 35 of 78
15  HG Manne, „Our Two Corporate Systems: Law and Economics“ 1967 Virginia Law Review 53 at pages 259-284
16  A Alchian and H Demsetz “Production, Information Costs and Economic Organisation” 1972
17  M Jensen and W Meckling „Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”
1976 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper.taf?ABSTRACT_ID=94043> at page 35 of 78 Also see Journal of Financial 
Economics Volume 3 No 4 at pages 305 -360
18  See ibid at page 36 of 78
6One of their solutions to the puzzling questions is that the key lies with transaction costs.19
The  existence  of  unlimited  liability,  in  their  view,  would  place  cost  obligations  (related 
monitoring liabilities and wealth of other owners) on shareholders and that such costs would be 
much  higher  than  payment  obligations  of  a  premium  consisting  of  higher  interest  rates  to 
creditors of the company (in return for an acceptance of a contract which would accord limited 
liability to shareholders).20 John, Saunders and Senbet21 contend that focussing bank regulations on 
bank capital ratios may prove to be an ineffective means of controlling risk taking. They seek to 
address  the  issue  by  recommending  a  more  direct  mechanism  which  would  not  only  impact 
incentives  in  bank  risk  taking,  but  which  also  illustrates  that  bank  owners  select  an  “optimal 
management  compensation  structure”  that  compels  the  bank’s  management  to  make  optimal 
choices.22
B.II Involvement of Banks in Long Term Financing and Correspondingly Low Liquidity  
Levels
From the perspective of long term results and performance, Maher and Andersson argue that whilst 
dispersed  ownership  has  the  perceived  benefits  of  generating  higher  liquidity,  that  it  may not 
provide „the right incentives to encourage long-term relationships that are vital for certain types of 
investment.“23 In addressing their concern that one challenge faced by policymakers constitutes the 
design of a good corporate governance framework „which can secure the benefits associated with 
controlling shareholders acting as direct monitors, while at the same time ensuring that they do not 
impinge upon the development of equity markets by expropriating excessive rents“, we now focus 
on the role of banks and auditors in the corporate governance process.
Maher  and Andersson's  consolidate  the  points  that  dispersed  ownership systems  (notably those 
which operate in the UK and the US), do not encourage long term relationships, by adding that 
German and Japanese systems of corporate governance are characterised by long term relationships 
19  ibid
20  As a result, the creditors would assume risk liability for any non payment of debts – should bankruptcy occur; ibid
21  See K John, A Saunders and LW Senbet, ‘A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation’ The
Review of Financial Studies 2000 Volume 13 No 1 at pages 95-125
22 ibid at page 95
23 M Maher and T Andersson, „Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and Economic Growth“ OECD 
1999 at page 23
7with banks  which,  in  their  opinion,  encourage bank financing,  whilst  firms in  the US and UK 
benefit from high levels of equity capital.24
From the above, it can be seen that compensation incentives for the agent would immensely benefit 
the shareholders if they are tied in to long term compensation arrangements, whilst the period of 
financing appears  also to be of  immense benefit  if  on a  long term basis  –  as  is  the case with 
concentrated ownerships – with certain investments.
How could monitoring be facilitated and enhanced – such that board ownership of shares does not 
constitute the most effective or most relied upon means or incentive whereby agents are inclined to 
better monitor the affairs of the firm? The involvement of banks in long term financing does not 
constitute the only merit to be derived from banks' involvement in corporate ownership structures. 
The use of external auditors by banks also provides for greater monitoring of firms. 
If insider trading could be discouraged – since consequently, agents have less incentives to act in 
their own interests where less opportunities for insider trading exist, this would reduce the need for 
monitoring. However, it  has also been highlighted by several  sources25 that  board ownership of 
shares,  that  is an existence of agents'  interests in the firm, could also have a positive effect on 
performance – hence effective corporate governance measures which serve to ensure that adequate 
monitoring and corporate governance arrangements are in place, appear to offer the best alternative.
In this sense external auditors will not only be able to play vital roles in corporate and financial 
reporting – hence reducing information asymmetries which may exist between principal and agent, 
but will also be supported through such internal monitoring devices as audit committees.
24 See ibid at page 25
25 See S Bhagat and B Bolton, „Corporate Governance and Firm Performance“ Journal of Corporate Finance 14 (2008) 
257 -273 at page 271. Bhagat and Bolton also add that „efforts to improve corporate governance should focus on 
stock ownership of board members – since it is positively related to both future operating performance, and to the 
probability  of  disciplinary  management  turnover  in  poorly  performing  firms.“  It  is  however  cautioned  that 
„proponents  of  board  independence  should  note  the  negative  relation  between  board  independence  and  future 
operating performance – hence if the purpose of board independence is to improve performance, then such efforts 
might  be  misguided.  However,  if  the  purpose  of  board  independence  is  to  discipline  managment  of  poorly 
performing firms, then board independence has its merits.“ see ibid at page 272
8C. Effective Audit Committees - Role of the Audit Committee in Corporate Governance
According  to  Article  1  paragraph  24  of  the  2006  Directive  on  Statutory  Audits, 26 audit 
committees  and  an  effective  internal  control  system  not  only  help  to  minimise  financial,
operational and compliance risks, but also “enhance the quality of financial reporting.” 
As well as playing a fundamental role in transmitting financial results to the general public, the 
audit  committee  serves  as  representative  of  shareholder  interests  and  is  required  to  facilitate  a 
process whereby management, external auditors and the chief executive can be questioned and held 
to account27 - if need be. The audit committee is not only responsible for monitoring the financial 
reporting process, but also the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls, the internal audit – 
where applicable, and risk management systems.28 It is also assigned with the task of monitoring the 
statutory  audit  of  the  annual  and  consolidated  accounts.  The  audit  committee  contribution  in 
facilitating the fulfilment of the external auditor’s role in corporate governance will be considered 
in the following section.
C II. Contribution of External Auditors in Helping to Resolve Agency Problems.
Corporate governance aims to resolve problems which arise from the principal-agent relationship,
whereby owners have an interest in maximising the value of their shares – whereas managers tend 
to be more interested in “the private consumption of firm resources and the growth of the firm”.29
It addresses such problems through the contract drafting process and others measures which are 
26  Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on statutory audits of annual accounts and
consolidated accounts amending Council Directives 78/ 660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and repealing Council Directive
84/253/EEC
27  S Green, Sarbanes Oxley and the Board of Directors: Techniques and Best Practices for Corporate Governance
2005 John Wiley and Sons at page 66
28  See Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on statutory audits of annual accounts
and consolidated accounts,Article 41(2) (a) and (b)
29  See S Vitols, ‚Corporate Governance versus Economic Governance: Banks and Industrial Restructuring in the US
and Germany’ 1995 < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=607641> (last visited 14 January 2011)
9developed.30
One measure  which  could  contribute  to  corporate  governance  efforts  in  addressing  the  agency 
problem is the external auditor’s involvement. Such involvement will be discussed  in  part,  with 
reference  to  the  Sarbanes  Oxley  Act’s  contribution  to  corporate governance. As of now, the 
engagement of the external auditor as a means of addressing agency problems will be considered.
Even though monitoring costs – unlike agency costs, cannot be avoided (as is the case with 100% 
owner management scenarios), they could be minimised. The external auditor would facilitate a 
situation whereby managers are encouraged or compelled to be held more accountable. Through an 
appropriate application of accounting policies, the external auditor could help facilitate a position 
whereby  creative  accounting  practices  and  hyper  inflation/inflation  of  figures  are discouraged. 
Penalties  could  be  imposed  on  managers  and  directors  who  intentionally  or recklessly inflate 
or manipulate accounting figures and financial statements. Such penalties could arise in the form of 
a reduction of such managers’ (and directors’) annual bonuses , remuneration or even pensions. The 
likelihood of a qualified audit opinion (as regards the auditor’s findings on the financial statements) 
is considered to be less effective as a deterrent to such managers – particularly where an individual 
manager  or  few  managers  are  held  responsible  for  fraudulent  related  acts.  In  such  a  case,  a 
„scapegoat“ or few scapegoats would be held to account for the negligent acts of others who should 
also have been brought to book for their actions.
Apportionment of liability on a proportionate basis would also produce a more equitable result – 
than is the case where a qualified opinion is issued by the auditor.  The financial audit remains an 
important aspect of corporate governance that makes management accountable to shareholders for 
its stewardship of a company.31
In this regard, attention is drawn to the importance of audit committees. Audit committees do not 
only serve as internal monitoring devices which support good corporate governance, they are also 
considered to be mechanisms of ensuring that an appropriate  relationship  exists  between  the 
auditor  and  the  management  whose  financial statements are being audited.32
30  See ibid
31  S Fearnley and V Beattie, Auditor Independence and Non-audit Services: a Literature Review (2002)at page 1
ICAEW, London
32  See V Beattie, S Fearnley and R Brandt, Behind Closed Doors: What the Company Audit is Really About (Institute
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 2001) at page 29; Also see Cadbury Report 1992 
10
Prior  to  corporate  governance  reforms  in  many  jurisdictions,  the  pressures  faced  by  external 
auditors from directors in many firms constituted the focus of several major issues. Furthermore 
“creative accounting” practices were widespread. The audit serves as a signalling mechanism to 
shareholders of a company that information provided by the company’s directors can be relied 
upon. Auditing standards have a role to play in ensuring that factors such as objectivity, integrity 
and  independence,  factors  which  are  essentially  in  the  external  auditor’s  performance  of  his 
responsibilities, are respected. 
However  attention  has  been drawn to  the  importance  of  other  issues  such as  enforcement  and 
disclosure standards:
“The  quality  of  reported  financial  information,  however,  is  influenced  not  simply  by  the  quality  of  accounting 
standards,  but  also  by  other  institutional  factors  [corporate  governance,  the  legal  system,  and  the  existence  and 
enforcement of laws governing investor protection and disclosure standards] that affect the demand for and the supply 
of financial information.”33
The crucial role played by enforcement in investor protection laws and disclosure standards in
corporate governance has also been highlighted.34
It is contended that investor ownership is not only likely to be diffuse, but that ownership is likely 
to be distinct  from control in common law countries.35 For effective enforcement to take place, 
shareholder litigation and bankruptcy laws may be vital routes to ensuring that investor rights are 
protected.36
According to Hopt,37 an improvement of corporate governance in Europe, in the aftermath of Enron 
33  See GG Mueller ‘The Role of Financial Reporting’ at page 109
<http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf44/cf44_8.pdf> (last visited 14 January 2011) and also SP Kotheri,
‘The role of financial reporting in reducing financial risks in the market’ 
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf44/cf44_6.pdf
34  Ibid; For further information on the impact of regulations and disclosure requirements on risk taking levels, please
refer to M Ojo, „The Impact of Capital and Disclosure Requirements on Risks and Risk Taking Incentives“
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1547023> and 
http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/20404/1/MPRA_paper_20404.pdf and also M Ojo, „Preparing for Basel IV : why 
liquidity risks still present a challenge to regulators in prudential supervision (II)“ <http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/27778/> and
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1732304>
35  See SP Kotheri, ‘The role of financial reporting in reducing financial risks in the market’ at page 99
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf44/cf44_6.pdf
36 ibid
37  K Hopt, ‘Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance After
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would require the involvement of intermediaries such as external auditors. Furthermore, he
notes that the control of the Board by auditors is not only the “most common”, but also the “most
prominent control mechanism.”38
Restrictions on the outsourcing of any internal audit functions to a client firm’s external auditor, a
consequence of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, is attributed to independence concerns.39
According to Abbott and others, outsourcing routine internal audit activities not only constitutes a
threat to external auditor’s independence – given its repetitive nature, but could also impair internal 
audit  independence  and  generate  disagreements  relating  to  financial  reporting  and internal 
control issues between the external auditor and management.40
Arguments for engaging the external auditor to undertake non routine tasks include the fact that non 
routine tasks are not only non repetitive by nature, they also require specialised knowledge which 
internal auditors may not be able to acquire in house.41 Further,  the use of external auditors in 
performing non routine tasks may be more efficient.42
Safeguards which exist to ensure that threats to auditor’s independence are mitigated include:
prohibitions, restrictions, policies, procedures and the requirement for disclosures.43
As a means of achieving maximum degree of harmonisation, EU member states are permitted to 
impose additional national audit procedures or requirements.44
Enron’ CGI Law Working Paper No. 05/2002 at page 476 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=356102>
38  ibid at page 497
39  See Abbott and others, ‘Corporate Governance, Audit Quality and the Sarbanes Oxley Act: Evidence from Internal
Audit Outsourcing’2007 at page1
40  see ibid at page 2 and page 12
41  ibid at page 3
42  Other advantages which have been identified in engaging the external auditor’s expertise – as opposed to that of an
outside  service  provider  include:  i)  Synergies  which  are  derived  from  “knowledge  spillovers”  between  the 
outsourcing of particular audits and which would generate a more comprehensive financial statement audit; ii) the
fact that the external auditor’s knowledge of the client’s accounting systems and functions facilitates collaborative
efforts between the internal and external auditors – which in turn generates greater efficiency; and that iii) the
external auditor’s knowledge of the client’s accounting systems could also reduce the risk of “budget overruns”. See
ibid at page 16
43  See Article 1 paragraph 11Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on statutory
audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts
44  Only where these can be attributed to specific national legal requirements which are related to the scope of the
statutory audit of annual or consolidated accounts – which implies that those requirements should not have been
covered by international auditing standards which have been adopted ; see ibid at Article 1 paragraph 13
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Furthermore, Article 22 paragraph 1of the Directive45 states that “Member States shall ensure that
when carrying out a statutory audit, the statutory auditor and/or the audit firm is independent of the 
audited entity and is not involved in the decision-taking of the audited entity.” Where any direct or 
indirect financial or business relationship exists between the statutory auditor, audit firm or branch 
of audit firm and the audited firm(and this includes the provision of additional non audit services), 
and an “objective, reasonable and informed third party” would deduce that the statutory auditor’s 
independence is being compromised, member states are required to ensure that such a statutory 
auditor or audit firm does not perform the audit.46
 In response to a situation whereby the external auditor is affected by threats,47 the statutory auditor 
is required to ensure that safeguards aimed at mitigating such threats are applied.48
D. Fair Values and the Finance Theory
In order for external auditors to effectively carry out their tasks, the use of fair value measures, in 
certain  instances,  as  the  basic  measure  for  IFRS,  merits  reconsideration.  Where  particularly 
complex and difficult to value financial products are involved, other measurement bases could be 
employed where (and if) greater relevance and certainty would be derived. Other measures such as 
historical cost, that is. Where vital characteristics of accounting information, characteristics such as 
understandability,  relevance,  comparability,  faithful  representation,  prudence  and  predictability 
inter  alia,  would be compromised  then  a  combination  of  measures  such  as  the historical  cost, 
current cost, realizable value and present value could be incorporated to achieve the best results 
which would enhance the value of accounting information.
The rise  in  fair  value  accounting  is  considered  to  be  attributed  to  Finance  Theory –  which  is 
premised on the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. Whilst fair value accounting certainly has its merits 
and is considered by many as a justifiable basis for the adoption of IFRS, its inability to contribute 
the desired level of relevance to the value of accounting information – so called value-relevance 
characteristics  which  are  essential  and  vital  for  information  within  capital  markets  (as  well  as 
45  Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on statutory audits of annual accounts and
consolidated accounts
46  See paragraph 2
47  For example, self-review, self interest, advocacy, familiarity, or trust and intimidation threats
48  See ibid; Where the significance of the threats, in comparison to the applied safeguards is such that external
auditor’s independence is compromised, the auditor is required not to undertake the statutory audit; paragraph 2. 
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information essential to other corporate and business spheres),  are  flaws not only associated with 
its implementation, but also attributes which increasingly link it to the Finance Theory.
The influence and role of Finance Theory in the use of off-balance sheet instruments during Enron, 
as well as other creative accounting practices is ironically, partly, contributory to the decision to 
introduce  IFRS  –  a  post  Enron  consequence.  However,  it  appears  that  part  of  the  underlying 
problems  in  the  case  of  Enron  –  namely  the  need  for  more  value  relevance  of  accounting 
information, appears, to a large extent, to have been ignored.
Kirkpatrick states that „another area where accounting standards have been put to the test concerns 
fair values of assets which either trade in thin markets or in no markets at all.“49 Since markets with 
relatively few large clients are considered to be thin markets, it  could inferred that such capital 
markets which operate in concentrated ownership systems (insider systems) which are typical of 
Europe (excluding the UK), and which are less developed than those of the UK and the U.S, will be 
more affected by fair value measures. 
Hence the „short termist behaviour“ relating to compensation appears to affect outsider systems, to 
a larger extent, whilst fair value measurements, it appears, will be more problematic for insider 
systems. Hence incorporating more actors such as banks might appear to be the logical solution to 
addressing  „short  termist“  executive  compensation  issues  with  outsider  systems  –  whilst  the 
involvement of external auditors through banks, could also facilitate a greater degree of monitoring 
and accountability to the shareholders.
As regards insider systems, executive compensation still requires redress – even if not really at the 
same scale as that required by outsider systems. Fair values as primary bases for the adoption of 
IFRS will require careful consideration – given many flaws which have also been revealed from the 
recent Financial Crisis.
49  G Kirkpatrick, „The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis“ Financial Market Trends ISSN 
1995-2864 OECD 2009 at page 26
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E. Conclusion
External  auditors  can  impact  the  risk  taking  incentives  of  management  through an  appropriate 
application of accounting policies. However, it is also important to ensure that rules (in the event of 
a   breach   of   accounting   polices)are   correspondingly   enforced.   The   external   auditor’s 
responsibilities  and  the  audit  committee’s  role  in  corporate  governance  are  fundamental
complements  in  helping  to  achieve  the  desired  aims  of  corporate  governance.  Safeguards  are 
necessary  to  ensure  that  the  external  auditor’s  expertise  is  maximised.  Even  though  external 
auditors  play  a  vital  role  in  corporate  governance,  through  their  involvement  and  their 
examination of financial statement and accounting policies,50 several areas continue to give rise to
problems.
IAS (International Accounting Standards) 32 and 39, two reporting standards which deal with off-
balance  sheet  instruments  and  which  created  problems  in  the  Parmalat  and  Enron  cases,  still 
constitute a challenge for the IASB. Off balance sheet instruments created problems in the afore 
mentioned cases owing to the fact that they were not reflected in the balance sheet – even though 
their sizes could have been as large as two to three times global GDP. The IASB will also face 
further challenges of reconciling these standards at a global level – with the US in particular. 
Further challenges also include contentious circumstances which exist  under  financial  reporting 
standards and bank rules. Under  IAS 32 what may be referred to as equity may not be permitted 
under bank regulation.
The role of executive compensation in exacerbating levels of risk taking by executives, as well as 
the contribution of  fair values to risks and uncertainties, have been demonstrated in the recent 
Financial Crisis. The external auditor has roles to play in both situations – through an engagement 
with banks whose involvement not only mitigates instances of „short termist“ behaviours, but also 
facilitates greater monitoring and accountability in the corporate governance process. Furthermore, 
through the application  and incorporation  of  appropriate  measures  and accounting  policies,  the 
external auditor is able to influence financial reporting in such a way as to ensure that bases of 
measurement reflect the desirable qualities and attributes of accounting information.
50  For further problems, including the difficulty of comprehending complex products, see S Green, Sarbanes Oxley
and the Board of Directors: Techniques and Best Practices for Corporate Governance 2005 John Wiley and Sons at
page 66
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Remuneration packages and compensation for executives should be dependent on their ability to 
comply  with  capital  and  liquidity  requirements  –  such  requirements  aimed  at  containing  and 
preventing risk contagion. Whilst flaws have been exposed with capital adequacy requirements and 
stress testing in the recent Financial Crisis – with certain firms operating within minimum capital 
adequacy requirements, and still collapsing, liquidity requirements also need to be complied with – 
particularly in the said jurisdictions that have lower availability of liquidity. Having said this, it also 
needs to be re-iterated that Bear Stearns and Northern Rock were operating within stipulated capital 
adequacy  requirements  but  were  facing  low  liquidity  levels  when  they  crashed.  In  rewarding 
executives for compliance with capital and liquidity requirements, such compensation will not only 
help secure the profitability and performance of such complying firms, but will also help to avoid 
systemic contagion which could arise as a result of liquidity and systemic risks.
Regulatory convergence – with the adoption of Basel III globally, as well as strict compliance with, 
and enforcement of Basel capital and liquidity standards, would not only facilitate consistency in 
the application and interpretation of regulatory standards, but would also introduce greater degree of 
certainty and  comparability which would greatly assist the ambit and scope of the application of 
international accounting standards. 
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